Joseph S. Tulchin

Lula's Gambit in Iran

It is an open secret that the Brazilian government has been in the midst of a policy review over the past few years to determine in what manner the country should assert its new power and influence on the broad global stage. For the past year or more, the debate has come down to two different strategies, with considerable areas of agreement between the two, but with some important differences. Lula’s recent trip to Iran and his effort to broker, with Turkey, an agreement with Iran over how to handle its uranium stocks is an example of an attempt to move to establish Brazil as a global player without having first completely resolved the internal debate. The results were mixed. It was ill-timed (the U.S. managed to bring the sanctions resolution to the Security Council a week later and won the votes necessary to pass it.). It infuriated a number of influential analysts, notably Tom Friedman and Moises Naim, and it forced Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to make several public comments attempting to gloss over any differences between the U.S. and Brazil.

But, before I judge Lula’s gambit, let me review briefly the debate:

In essence, the discussions in Brazil, which include prominent private sector representatives, the military, Lula’s closest advisers and the foreign ministry, Itarmaraty, have produced two strategies for moving Brazil onto the global stage and into a seat on the UN Security Council. The first is the globalization view that Brazil is now a world power, with its new petroleum wealth, the success in reducing income inequality, and the consolidation of the nation’s democratic institutions, and that, given its soft and hard power, it should move to become a major rule-maker in world affairs. In this view, there is a clear understanding that such a move would entail costs, especially in pushing Brazil to side with the other world powers on issues where Brazil has been in opposition in the past. This view also acknowledges the tradition of the Baron of Rio Branco, which saw Brazil as a regional power in South America and a power that would not cow-tow to the U.S.

The other strategy sees Brazil becoming a world power without paying any significant costs, by virtue of its new power. This strategy is more nationalistic and has a tinge of old-fashioned Uncle Sam bashing, and takes the base of Brazil’s world influence to be its undeniable influence in South America. In this view, Lula’s visit to Iran and its public statements on the Palestine question, as well as his embrace of Fidel Castro on a visit to Cuba are the first steps in a concerted effort to assume Brazil’s role in world affairs.

Lula actually got off easy with his Iran gambit. The Obama administration is convinced that Brazil is its only strategic option in Latin America and Secretary Clinton’s comments on her way back from the OAS meeting in Lima indicates that there will be little or no retribution for Brazil’s transgression, unlike Turkey, a member of NATO that has had its hand slapped. On the other hand, it is inconceivable that Brazil can become a major player without paying the costs of sitting at the table. Lula’s comments and actions regarding Iran, Israel, Cuba, and Venezuela have seriously undermined his democratic credentials. At the same time, the internal debate has weakened the regional strategy without gaining any ground for the globalization faction. If Brazil is such a regional power, why doesn’t it help Venezuela and Colombia resolve their differences? Why is Brazil gutting Mercosur? Why does it allow UNASUR to be made a laughing stock by electing Nestor Kirchner as its chief? There is still a lot of confusion in Brazil new global strategy.

On balance, Lula appears to have gotten away with his Iran gambit without too much damage. However, before Brazil can play an important role in world affairs it must resolve the internal debate over long term strategy. With elections at the end of the year, it is unlikely that the anachronistic Uncle Sam bashers in the inner circle will have the same influence under any new government in Brasilia. Perhaps the Iran incident can help to convince the Brazilian leadership that there is no free lunch in international affairs and that it had better get its act together before another foray on the world stage.

Communication

Tulchin is a dynamic lecturer, equally effective with small groups and large. He has lectured on Latin American affairs to age groups stretching from high school students to elderhostel members. He has lectured to groups of corporate executives, military officers, policymakers, and policy analysts. He has appeared frequently on television and radio, in both Spanish and English.

Project Management

Tulchin has spent twenty years managing projects that deal with research and analysis of Latin America. He is an experienced and highly efficient manager. He is expert in formulating research topics and focusing the effort by a team of specialists to produce a final product of use to a client or a specific policy constituency.

Research and Analysis

During his extensive academic career, Tulchin taught research methodology and strategic planning. This experience was put to good use during his years as a program manager at the Wilson Center when he defined a research agenda, raised the funds to carry out the research and produced reports and books to bring the results of the research to a wide audience.